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Payne v. Tennessee: The Supreme Court 
Places Its Stamp of Approval on the 
Use of "Victim Impact Evidence" During 
Capital Sentencing Proceedings 
' Over the past few years, "victims' rights" advocates have 
insisted that state legislatures and Congress make the criminal 
justice system more responsive and accountable to the victims 
of crime.' These advocates have been particularly outspoken 
about the lack of attention paid to crime victims during the 
sentencing phase of capital  trial^.^ The majority of state legis- 
latures3 and Congress4 responded to these demands by pass- 
ing laws that allow the sentencing authority to consider "victim 
impact eviden~e"~ when meting out a criminal's punishment. 
In Payne v. Tennessee6 the Supreme Court also placed its 
stamp of approval on the use of victim impact evidence during 
the sentencing phase of capital trials. The Payne Court held 
that the Eighth Amendment does not erect a per se bar prohib- 
iting a capital sentencing jury from considering victim impact 
evidence relating to the personal characteristics of the victim 
and the emotional impact of the crimes on the victim's family.' 
This Note examines the Supreme Court's decision in 
Payne. Part I1 provides the background for the case by briefly 
1. See Diane Kiesel, Crime and Punishment: Victim Rights Movement Presses 
Courts, Legislatures, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1984, at  25, 25; Frank Carrington & George 
Nicholson, The Victims' Movement: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 11 PEPP. L. 
REV. 1 (1984). 
2. See Josephine Gittler, Expanding the Role of the Victim in a Criminal Ac- 
tion: An Overview of Issues and Problems, 11 PEpp. L. REV. 117, 172-76 (1984). 
3. See Phillip A. Talbert, Comment, The Relevance of Victim Impact State- 
ments to the Criminal Sentencing Decision, 36 UCLA L. REV. 199, 200 (1988). 
4. See Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 
§ 2(b)(l), 96 Stat. 1248, 1248-49. 
5. In this Note, the term "victim impact evidencen includes any evidence relat- 
ing to the personal characteristics of the victim or the emotional effects of the 
crime on the victim's family. See Charlton T. Howard 111, Note, Booth v. Mary- 
land-Death Knell for the Victim Impact Statement?, 47 MD. L. REV. 701, 701 n.2 
(1988). 
6. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991). 
7. Id. at 2609. 
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summarizing the two Supreme Court decisions that Payne 
overr~led.~ Part I11 outlines the facts of the case and sets forth 
the Court's reasons for allowing a capital sentencing jury to 
consider victim impact evidence. Part IV analyzes Payne by 
focusing on the decision's underlying rationale and the new 
standard the decision establishes. This Note concludes that 
Payne achieves a just result by striking a balance between the 
rights of murder victims and the rights of capital murder de- 
fendants. 
The Supreme Court first ruled on the use of victim impact 
evidence during the sentencing phase of capital trials in the 
1987 case of Booth u. M~ryland.~ In Booth the Court reviewed 
a Maryland statute1' requiring that a "victim impact state- 
ment"" be presented at the sentencing phase of a capital 
murder trial. The High Court declared the statute invalid, to 
the extent that it required consideration of victim impact evi- 
dence,12 because a capital sentencing jury's consideration of 
such evidence violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment.13 The Court reasoned 
that victim impact evidence was "irrelevant to a capital sen- 
tencing decision, and that its admission creates a constitu- 
tionally unacceptable risk that the jury may impose the death 
penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner."14 
The Supreme Court reiterated this holding two years later 
in South Carolina v. Gathers.15 In Gathers the trial court ad- 
mitted into evidence a religious tract and a voter registration 
8. Payne expressly overruled Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), and 
South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989). Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2611. 
9. 482 U.S. 496 (1987). 
10. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41 $ 4-609(d) (1986). The statute stated that "[iln any 
case in which the death penalty . . . is requested . . . a presentence investigation, 
including a victim impact statement, shall be completed . . . and shall be consid- 
ered by the court or jury before whom the separate sentencing proceeding is con- 
ducted . . . .* Id. 
11. The victim impact statement in Booth "emphasized the victims' outstanding 
personal qualities . . . . [It also] described the emotional and personal problems 
the family members [had] faced as a result of the crimes." Booth, 482 U.S. at 499. 
12. Id. at  509. 
13. Id. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, 
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. 
CONST. amend. VIII. 
14. Booth, 482 U.S. at 502-03. 
15. 490 U.S. 805 (1989). 
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card that were found on the victim. In his closing argument, 
the prosecutor suggested that these items were indicative of 
the victim's outstanding personal characteristics and his value 
to the community. On appeal, the Court extended Booth by 
declaring that victim impact evidence offered by a prosecutor 
during the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial violated 
the Eighth Amendment.'6 The Gathers Court reasoned that  
"[a]llo~ing the jury to rely on [this information] . . . could re- 
sult in imposing the death sentence because of factors about 
which the defendant was unaware, and that were irrelevant to 
the decision to kill."" The decision also noted "that '[flor pur- 
poses of imposing the death penalty . . . [the defendant's] pun- 
ishment must be tailored to his personal responsibility and 
moral guilt.' "I8 
In both Booth and Gathers, the Court clearly held that the 
admissibility of victim impact evidence was not to be deter- 
mined on a case-by-case basis, but that i t  was per se inadmiss- 
ible in the sentencing phase of a capital trial unless it "relat- 
e[d] directly to the circumstances of the crime.'"' Payne ex- 
pressly overruled Booth and GathersZ0 by attacking the rea- 
soning on which the two cases relied.21 
111. Payne v. Tennessee 
A. The Facts 
Pervis Tyrone Payne's girlfriend lived in an  apartment 
complex in Millington, Tennessee. On Saturday, June 27, 1987, 
Payne visited the apartment complex several times in search of 
his girlfriend, but she was not a t  home. Payne returned to the 
apartment complex around 3:00 p.m., after having passed the 
morning and early afternoon drinking beer and injecting co- 
caine. He then entered an  apartment across the hall from his 
girlfriend's and began making sexual advances towards Cha- 
risse Christopher. Payne became violent when Charisse resist- 
ed his advances. A neighbor called the police after hearing 
16. Id. at 811. 
17. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Booth, 482 U.S. at 505). 
18. Id. at 810 (alteration in original) (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 
801 (1982)). 
19. Booth, 482 U.S. at 507 n.10; Gathers, 490 U.S. at 811. 
20. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2610-11. 
21. See d. at 2605. 
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Charisse yell, "Get out, get out," followed by a "blood-curdling 
Upon their arrival, the police encountered a horrifying 
scene. Blood was smeared on the walls and floor of the apart- 
ment. Charisse, her two-year old daughter Lacie, and her 
three-year old son Nicholas were lying on the kitchen floor. 
Charisse and Lacie were both dead. The police found that Cha- 
risse had sustained forty-two direct knife wounds and forty-two 
defensive wounds on her arms and hands. Lacie had suffered 
stab wounds to the chest, abdomen, back, and head. Nicholas 
survived despite several wounds inflicted by a butcher knife 
that penetrated his body from front to back. The murder weap- 
on, a butcher knife, was found at Lacie's feet. The police also 
found Payne's baseball cap on Lacie's arm and discovered three 
cans of malt liquor bearing Payne's fingerprints near her 
body.23 
Payne was apprehended later that day hiding in the attic 
of a former girlfriend's home. He had blood on his body and 
clothes and several scratches across his chest. The police also 
found in a nearby dumpster a bloody white shirt stuffed in 
Payne's overnight bag. The blood stains on Payne's body and 
clothes matched the victims' blood types.24 
At trial, the jury convicted Payne on two counts of first 
degree murder and one count of assault with intent to commit 
murder in the'first degree.25 During the sentencing phase of 
the trial, Payne presented the testimony of four witnesses: his 
mother and father, his current girlfriend, and a clinical psy- 
chologist specializing in criminal court evaluation work. The 
parents said that he was good with children and that he was a 
good son.26 Payne's girlfriend stated that he was a very caring 
person and "behaved just like a father that loved his kids? 
The clinical psychologist testified that Payne was the most 
polite prisoner he had ever met.28 
The State then presented the testimony of Charisse's moth- 
er. When asked how her grandson Nicholas had been affected 
by the murders of his mother and sister, she responded: 
22. Respondent's Brief at 3-4, Payne (No. 90-5721). 
23. Payne, 111 S. C t .  at 2602. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 2601. 
26. Id. at 2603. 
27. Id at 2602. 
28. Id. 
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"He cries for his mom. He doesn't seem to understand why 
she doesn't come home. And he cries for his sister Lacie. He 
comes to me many times during the week and asks me, 
Grandmama, do you miss my Lacie. And I tell him yes. He 
says, I'm worried about my La~ie ."~ 
In his closing argument for the death penalty, the prosecutor 
emphasized the emotional impact that the murders had, and 
would continue to have, on Nicholas's life.30 
Following the testimony and the prosecutor's closing state- 
ment, the jury sentenced Payne to death on each of the murder 
counts. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Tennessee upheld 
Payne's conviction and senten~e.~' The United States Supreme 
Court then granted certiorari and affirmed the decision.32 In 
so doing, the Court reversed its prior rulings, and held that the 
Eighth Amendment does not erect a per se bar prohibiting a 
capital sentencing jury from considering victim impact evi- 
d e n ~ e . ~ ~  
B. The Payne Court's Reasoning 
In Payne, the Court first criticized the reasoning set forth 
in Booth and Gathers, pointing out that both decisions were 
based on the premises that evidence relating to a victim, or the 
harm to a victim's family, does not "reflect on the defendant's 
'blameworthiness,' and that only evidence relating t o  'blame- 
worthiness' is relevant to the capital sentencing decision.'"* 
The Payne Court denounced these premises, reasoning that the 
harm caused by a criminal defendant has always been an es- 
sential concern of criminal law since the degree of harm caused 
is important in determining the elements of the offense and the 
appropriate punish~nent.~~ The majority concluded, therefore, 
that victim impact evidence is relevant t o  the sentencing deci- 
sion because it conveys the full extent of the harm caused, 
which the Court felt reflected on the defendant's blameworthi- 
n e s ~ . ~ ~  
Id. at 2603 (citation omitted). 
Id. 
State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10 (Tern. 1990). 
Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2611. 
Id. at 2609. 
Id. at 2605. 
Id. See infia note 64. 
Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2605. 
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The Court also attacked Booth and Gathers on fairness 
grounds. First, the Court criticized Booth's requirement that 
the sentencing authority "focus on the defendant as a 'uniquely 
individual human bein[g]""' when determining the defend- 
ant's punishment. The Court stated that this requirement was 
derived from a "misreading of pre~edent ,"~~ and that the de- 
fendant should not receive such specialized treatment "wholly 
apart from the crime which he had c~mmitted."~~ The Court 
reasoned that it was inherently unfair to  place a constitutional 
bar against victim impact evidence while at the same time 
allowing the defendant to  introduce mitigating evidence totally 
unrelated to the circumstances of the crime.40 Second, the 
Court pointed out that the victim of a crime is also a unique 
indi~idual:~ and that admitting victim impact evidence makes 
the sentencing proceeding fair by providing the jury with all 
the information it needs to make its decision.42 
The Court rejected Payne's argument that "admission of 
37. Booth, 482 U.S. at  504 (alteration in original) (quoting Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ., plurality opin- 
ion)). The Booth Court reasoned that allowing a capital sentencing jury t:, consider 
victim impact evidence would violate this requirement. Id. 
38. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2607. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 2607-09. See also State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 19 (Tern. 1990), in 
which the Tennessee Supreme Court criticized the Booth rule: 
I t  is an affront to the civilized members of the human race to say 
that at sentencing in a capital case, a parade of witnesses may praise the 
background, charactclr and good deeds of Defendant (as was done in this 
case), without limitation as to relevancy, but nothing may be said that 
bears u@on the character of, or the harm imposed, upon the victims. 
"[Tlhe State has a legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating evi- 
dence which the defendant is entitled to pat in, by reminding the sen- 
tencer that just as the murderer should be considered as an individual, so 
too the victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to 
society and in particular to his family." 
Payne, 111 S. Ct. at  2608 (alteration in original) (quoting Booth, 482 U.S. a t  517 
(White, J., dissenting)). See also Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934) 
(Cardozo, J.) ("[Jlustice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The 
concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are 
to keep the balance true."). 
42. 
Id. 
Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2608. In Payne the Court emphasized that 
[bly turning the victim into a "faceless stranger at  the penalty phase of a 
capital trial," Gathers, 490 US. at  821 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), Booth 
deprives the State of the hll moral force of its evidence and may prevent 
the jury from having before i t  all the information necessary to determine 
the proper punishment for a fwst-degree murder. 
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victim impact evidence permits a jury to find that defendants 
whose victims were assets to their community are more deserv- 
ing of punishment than those whose victims are perceived to be 
less 'Victim impact evidence," said the Payne 
Court, "is not offered to encourage comparative judgments of 
this kind,'"4 but rather to show "each victim's 'uniqueness as 
an individual human being,' whatever the jury might think the 
loss t o  the community resulting from his death might be."45 
Payne also advanced a procedural argument laid down in 
Booth. The Booth Court "reasoned that victim impact evidence 
must be excluded because it  would be difficult, if not impos- 
sible, for the defendant to  rebut such evidence without shifting 
the focus of the sentencing hearing away from the defendant, 
thus creating a ' "mini-trial" on the victim's character.' '"' The 
Payne Court gave a two-fold answer to this argument. First, it 
explained that excluding victim impact evidence a t  the sentenc- 
ing phase would not resolve the defendant's problem, since the 
jury may already be aware of the victim impact evidence be- 
cause it is introduced as relevant evidence during the ' guilt 
phase of the triaL4? Second, the Court noted that the de- 
fendant's tactical reasons for not wanting to rebut victim im- 
pact evidence did not distinguish him from other parties faced 
with this dilemma48 because the defendant's tactical dilemma 
did not override the necessity of allowing a sentencing jury to 
hear all relevant evidence before making a decision.49 
The Court advanced another reason why capital sentencing 
juries should be allowed t o  consider victim impact evidence. 
Prior to Booth and Gathers, "the sentencing authority [was] 
always . . . free to consider a wide range of relevant materi- 
al."50 The Payne Court concluded that victim impact evidence 
43. Id. at 2607. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. (quoting Booth, 482 U.S. at 507). 
47. Id. 
48. Id. Although the Court did not explain this "dilemma," the Court was prob- 
ably referring to defense counsel's difficult choice between rebutting victim impact 
evidence or foregoing such an opportunity. By choosing not to rebut victim impact 
evidence, defense counsel runs the risk that the sentencing authority will place 
great weight in such evidence. On the other hand, if defense counsel elects to 
rebut victim impact evidence, the sentencing authority's sympathies for the victim 
may be aroused while its attitude toward the defendant may become hostile. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 2606. 
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falls within this "range" because the harm caused by the crime 
is an important factor to take into account when imposing a 
~en tence .~~  
Finally, the Court emphasized that its decision to elimi- 
nate the per se bar against the use of victim impact evidence is 
not unfair to defendants because the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments impose certain limits on a state's death penalty 
The Eighth Amendment limits state punishment 
schemes by disallowing the death penalty for certain crimes.53 
Once a state complies with this limitation, however, it has wide 
latitude to choose the factors that are relevant to a sentencing 
decision.54 The Court reasoned, therefore, that "victim impact 
evidence serves entirely legitimate purposes"55 and is merely 
another method "of informing the sentencing authority about 
the specific harm caused by the crime in question."56 The 
Fourteenth Amendment also protects the defendant. If "evi- 
dence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders 
the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief."57 
In the second half- of the opinion, the Court rejected 
Payne's plea that the doctrine of stare decisis should prevent 
the Court from overruling Booth and  gather^.^' This Note 
does not discuss the issue of stare decisis raised in the second 
half of Payne; rather, the Note analyzes the Court's new rule 
51. Id. 
52. See id. at 2607-08. 
53. Id. The Payne Court identified these limits: 
"[Tlhere is a required threshold below which the death penalty cannot be 
imposed. In this context, the State must establish rational criteria that 
narrow the decisionmaker's judgment as to whether the circumstances of 
a particular defendant's case meet the threshold. Moreover, a societal 
consensus that the death penalty is disproportionate to a particular of- 
fense prevents a State from imposing the death penalty for that offense." 
Id. at 2608 (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 305-06 (1987)). 
54. Id. In Payne the Court stated that " '[wlithin the constitutional limitations 
defined by our cases, the States enjoy their traditional latitude to prescribe the 
method by which those who commit murder should be punished.' " Id. (quoting 
Blystone v. Pe~sylvania,  494 U.S. 299, 309 (1990)); see also California v. Ramos, 
463 U.S. 992, 1001 (1983) ("Beyond these [constitutional] limitations . . . the Court 
has deferred to the State's choice of substantive factors relevant to the penalty 
determination."). 
55. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2608. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at  2609-11. 
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which allows the sentencing authority in a capital murder trial 
to consider victim impact evidence. 
The Payne Court correctly overruled Booth and Gathers. 
The underlying rationale of Booth and Gathers was fundamen- 
tally unsound and did not justify a per se bar against the ad- 
mission of evidence regarding the personal characteristics of a 
murder victim and the impact of the crime on the victim's fami- 
ly members. 
A. Victim Impact Evidence Reflects Upon 
the Defendant's Personal Responsibility 
and Moral Guilt and Is Highly Relevant 
to the Sentencing Decision 
Both Booth and Gathers reasoned that any evidence offered 
at the sentencing phase of a capital trial must have "some 
bearing on the defendant's 'personal responsibility and moral 
guilt.' "59 While this is true, the decisions erroneously conclud- 
ed that victim impact evidence does not reflect on the personal 
responsibility and moral guilt of the defendant.'' 
1. Personal responsibility 
Victim impact evidence illustrates the full extent of the 
harm caused and directly reflects on the defendant's personal 
responsibility. Booth incorrectly focuses on the defendant's 
mental state, which it claims is the sole indicator of blamewor- 
thiness:' without considering the harm that results from the 
crime. However, the harm caused should also be considered by 
the sentencing a ~ t h o r i t y . ~ ~  Two defendants with the same 
mental state frequently receive different punishmentsB3 be- 
59. Booth, 482 US. at 502 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 US. 782, 801 
(1982)); see also Gathers, 490 US. at 810-11. 
60. In Booth and Gathers the Court concluded that victim impact evidence is 
irrelevant to a capital sentencing decision because it presents "factors about which 
the defendant was unaware, and that were irrelevant to the decision to kill." 
Booth, 482 US. at 505; Gathers, 490 US. at 811. 
61. See Booth, 482 US. at  502, 504. 
62. In Booth, 482 US. at 519 (Scalia, J., dissenting), Justice Scalia opined that 
"the amount of harm one causes does bear upon the extent of his 'personal respon- 
sibility.' " 
63. Justice Scalia gave an example in his dissenting opinion in Booth: "We may 
take away the license of a driver who goes 60 miles an hour on a residential 
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cause the harm caused is a relevant factor in determining per- 
sonal responsibility and an appropriate p u n i ~ h m e n t . ~ ~  Thus, 
as Payne demonstrates, victim impact evidence is admissible 
because the full extent of the harm caused is a direct measure 
of the defendant's personal respon~ibility.~~ 
2. Moral guilt6" 
Contrary to Booth, which claimed that victim impact evi- 
dence is generally "unrelated to the blameworthiness of a par- 
ticular defendant,"67 Payne correctly recognizes that victim 
impact evidence is often directly related to a defendant's moral 
c~ lpab i l i t y .~~  Booth conceded that if a defendant has subjec- 
tive knowledge of a victim's particular circumstances prior to 
the crime, such knowledge is indicative of the defendant's mor- 
al However, subjective knowledge of a victim's particu- 
lar circumstances is not the only relevant factor in assessing a 
defendant's moral guilt. 
The objective foreseeable consequences of a capital defend- 
ant's actions should also be considered in determining his or 
her moral guilt.'' It is indisputable that "[mlurder has fore- 
street; but we will put him in jail for manslaughter if, though his moral guilt is 
no greater, he is unlucky enough to kill someone during the escapade." Id. 
64. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at  2605. See generally Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and 
Punishment: A Critique of the Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal 
Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497, 1498 (1974) ("The criminal law attributes major 
significance to the harm actually caused by a defendant's conduct, as distinguished 
from the harm intended or risked."). 
65. See Payne, 111 S. Ct. at  2605. 
66. The terms "moral guilt" or "moral culpability" refer to the mental state of 
the defendant (i.e., mens rea) at the time the crime was committed. Cf. Howard, 
supm note 5, at  711; Richard S. Murphy, The Significance of Victim Harm: Booth 
v. Maryland and the Philosophy of Punishment in the Supreme Court, 55 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1303, 1317 (1988). 
67. Booth, 482 U.S. at 504. 
68. See Payne, 111 S. Ct. at  2605. 
69. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 504-05. Booth, however, claimed that the "foresee- 
able consequences of a defendant's actions . . . [are not] relevant in the unique 
circumstances of a capital sentencing hearing." Id. at 504. 
70. The Booth Court itself implicitly recognized that the objective foreseeable 
consequences of a defendant's actions relate to his or her moral guilt. The Court 
noted that a "defendant's degree of knowledge of the probable consequences of his 
actions may increase his moral culpability in a constitutionally significant manner." 
Id. at  505 (emphasis added). The phrase "defendant's degree of knowledge" refers 
to the defendant's subjective knowledge, while the language "probable consequences" 
seems to refer to the objective foreseeable consequences of a defendant's actions. 
Thus, both an objective and a subjective inquiry must be made to determine 
whether a particular defendant is morally guilty. 
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seeable  consequence^."^' It is a fact of life that human beings 
develop personal relationships with family and friends.72 
When someone is killed, people are left behind to suffer. 
Defendants may claim that the unintended consequences of 
their actions-the suffering and grief borne by the victim's 
family members-are completely unforeseeable and irrelevant 
in determining moral guilt. Such an argument cannot stand up 
to scrutiny. When someone voluntarily chooses to engage in a 
criminal act, he or she runs a risk that unintended consequ- 
ences will follow. Because defendants knowingly run this risk, 
they are morally culpable for any harm which should be "rea- 
sonably anti~ipated.'"~ What should be reasonably anticipated 
depends on human and societal e~perience.?~ Since all defen- 
dants are human beings living in society, each defendant 
should reasonably anticipate the full range of consequences 
that may flow from his or her actions (e.g., that the victim may 
have family and friends who will grieve and suffer). Moreover, 
because each defendant should anticipate the consequences of 
his or her actions, the defendant's choice to run a risk is highly 
relevant in assessing the defendant's mental state.75 Thus, the 
objective foreseeability of murder's consequences converts vic- 
tim impact evidence into relevant information which bears 
upon the defendant's moral guilt. 
71. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2615 (Souter, J., concurring). 
72. Justice Souter commented on the personal relationships that human beings 
develop: 
Every defendant knows, if endowed with the mental competence for crimi- 
nal responsibility, that the life he will take by his homicidal behavior is 
that of a unique person, like himself, and that the person to be killed 
probably has close associates, "survivors," who will suffer harms and de- 
privations from the victim's death. Just as defendants know that they are 
not faceless human ciphers, they know that their victims are not value- 
less fungibles, and just as defendants appreciate the web of relationships 
and dependencies in which they live, they know that their victims are not 
human islands, but individuals with parents or children, spouses or 
friends or dependents. 
Id. 
73. Respondent's Brief a t  8, Payne (No. 90-5721). 
74. Id. 
75. If the defendant is aware of particular circumstances related to the crime 
or the victim's life, even the Booth Court recognized that victim impact evidence 
would reflect upon the defendant's moral guilt. See Booth, 482 U.S. a t  505. 
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B. Admitting Victim Impact Evidence 
During the Sentencing Phase Recognizes 
the Rights of the Victim as an Individual 
and Effects a Broad and Balanced Inquiry into 
Both the Defendant's and the Victim's Rights 
Payne strikes a fair balance between the rights of the crim- 
inal defendant and the murder victim. Booth advanced the 
requirement that a capital defendant be treated as a " 'uniquely 
individual human bein[g~.""~ As part of this treatment, the 
defendant was allowed to  introduce at  the sentencing phase of 
a trial virtually any relevant mitigating e~idence.~' While vir- 
tually no limits were placed on what the defendant could intro- 
duce, the state was precluded from introducing evidence about 
either the victim's personal characteristics or the loss to  the 
victim's family and society. Booth failed to  realize that victim 
impact evidence is not inconsistent with the requirement of 
treating the defendant as a "uniquely individual human being." 
To the contrary, the admission of victim impact evidence makes 
the sentencing process more individualized by augmenting the 
information that the jury should consider in determining the 
appropriate punishment. Moreover, fairness demands that the 
state be able to introduce evidence showing the victim's unique- 
ness as an individual human being.78 This gives the jury all 
the relevant information about the defendant's moral guilt t o  
make a fully individualized decision based upon the personal 
responsibility of the particular defendant. 
Precluding the sentencer from considering the harm result- 
ing from a crime is inconsistent with longstanding principles of 
criminal responsibility and the basic tenets of our criminal 
justice system.7g The effects of a crime on the victim and oth- 
ers is highly relevant to a sentencing determination of the 
defendant's culpability,8' especially when one considers that 
"sentencing decisions [as opposed to conviction decisions] [are 
76. Id. at 504 (alteration in original) (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 
U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ., plurality opinion)). 
77. See Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2607. 
78. As Justice Souter appropriately noted, "[alny failure to take account of a 
victim's individuality and the effects of his death upon close survivors would thus 
more appropriately be called an act of lenity than their consideration an invitation 
to arbitrary sentencing." Id. at 2616 (Souter, J., concurring). 
79. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36. 
80. SeePayne, 111 S. Ct. at 2614(Souter, J., concurring). 
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to] rest on a far-reaching inquiry into countless facts and cir- 
cums tan~es."~' 
C. Deference to the Legislatures Requires 
Courts to Admit Victim Impact Evidence 
at the Sentencing Phase 
The Payne Court's deference to the legislative decision to 
admit victim impact evidence is long overdue. Forty-four states 
and the federal government have laws allowing the admission 
of victim impact evidence during the sentencing phase of a 
trial.82 Such laws are permissible because neither the lang- 
uage nor the history of the Eighth Amendment delineate the 
criteria that states or the federal government should lay down 
in determining appropriate punishment schemes. Moreover, 
these laws deserve special deference because the determination 
of appropriate punishment schemes is strictly a question of 
legislative And because legislatures reflect the will of 
the people, victim impact evidence should be admitted at the 
sentencing phase? 
D. Payne Resolves the Unworkable 
Rule Set Forth in Booth 
Booth's prophylactic ban on victim impact evidence at the 
sentencing phase of a capital murder trial created an unwork- 
able rule. Evidence of the victim's personal characteristics and 
the crime's results on the victim's family is often presented to 
the jury in conjunction with the facts that establish the circum- 
81. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 902 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
82. Through 1988, 38 states had enacted victim impact evidence legislation. 
See Talbert, supra note 3, a t  200 11-12. Six jurisdictions have since enacted legisla- 
tion. ALASKA STAT. $ 12.55.022 (1990); ARK. CODE ANN. $ 5-65-109 (Michie Supp. 
1991); D.C. CODE ANN. $ 23-103a (1989); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. $ 421.520 (Baldwin 
Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. 8 217.762 (Vernon Supp. 1991); TEX. CODE CRIM. 
PROC. ANN. art. 5603 (West 1990). See also Respondent's Brief at  10 n.1, Payne 
(NO. 90-572 1). 
83. "The deference . . . oweid] to the decisions of the state legislatures under 
our federal system . . . is enhanced where the specification of punishments is con- 
cerned, for 'these are peculiarly questions of legislative policy.' " Gregg v. Georgia, 
, 428 US. 153, 176 (1976) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted). 
84. The people themselves should decide the appropriate punishment to be 
meted out. In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 US. at 184, the Court said, "the decision that 
capital punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an expres- 
sion of the community's belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an 
affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death." 
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stances of the  rime.'^ The two are often inextricably inter- 
twined. Allowing victim impact evidence to be introduced dur- 
ing the guilt phase (because it related directly to the circum- 
stances of the crime) and then preventing references to the 
same information during the sentencing phase is inconsistent. 
The same jury that determines the defendant's guilt may play 
a crucial role in the sentencing decision as well. Thus, if these 
facts are not kept from the jury a t  the gudt stage, they will 
likely be on the jurors' minds at the sentencing stage? In  
short, the Booth rule was practically impossible to apply. 
One of two possible courses of action could hzve been pur- 
sued to correct the problem created by Booth. First, the proce- 
dural rules applied during the guilt phase of the trial could 
have been changed to exclude victim impact evidence unknown 
to the defendanLs7 However, this alternative "would [have] 
seriously reduce[d] the comprehensibility of most trials by de- 
priving jurors of those details of context that allow them to 
understand what is being described."" Second, a separate jury 
could have been selected for the sentencing phase of the 
trial." This alternative was also infeasible because imposing 
such a procedure on the states would have been unduly bur- 
d e n ~ o m e . ~ ~  
Furthermore, even if the jury could have been successfully 
prevented from considering victim impact evidence a t  the sen- 
tencing phase of a trial under the Booth rule, arbitrary sen- 
tencing results would still have oc~urred.~' Booth required 
that all evidence of which the defendant was unaware be ex- 
cluded. Thus, if a defendant was unaware that a member of the 
victim's family was watching the murder, such evidence would 
have been inadmis~ib le .~~  However, if a defendant had hap- 
pened to catch a glimpse of the victim's family member, evi- 
dence of the family member's presence would have been admis- 
sible because the defendant was aware of it. The decision of 
whether or not to admit victim impact evidence should not turn 
on such trivial distinctions. Allowing the death sentence to turn 
85. See Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2616 (Souter, J., concurring). 




90. See id. 
91. Id. 
92. See id. 
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on such happenstance would have made the sentencing deci- 
sion extremely arbitrary. The unworkable rule set forth in  
Booth was resolved by Payne, which allows admission of victim 
impact evidence during the sentencing phase of capital trials. 
E. Unduly Prejudicial Victim Impact -Euidence 
May Be Excluded by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor emphasized that 
the Payne decision does not 'mean that "victim impact evidence 
must be admitted, or even that it should be admitted."g3 The 
Court merely held that "if a State decides to permit consider- 
ation of this evidence, 'the Eighth Amendment erects no per se 
bar.' "94 If states choose to admit victim impact evidence, Jus- 
tice O'Connor pointed out that capital murder defendants can 
seek relief under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment if the evidence is unduly p re j~d ic i a l .~~  By invok- 
ing the Due Process Clause, murder defendants can preserve 
their constitutional rights where such rights are jeopardized. In  
sum, Payne adopts a practical, flexible approach. I t  allows 
states to admit victim impact evidence a t  the sentencing phase 
of a captial trial, but provides murder defendants with recourse 
to the Due Process Clause if the evidence is unduly prejudicial. I 
V. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF VICTIM 
IMPACT EVIDENCE AT THE SENTENCING 
PHASE OF CAPITAL MURDER TRIALS 
The Supreme Court has finally paved the way for equality 
between defendants and murder victims. Payne ensures that 
the victims of violent crime can introduce victim impact evi- 
dence a t  the sentencing phase of a capital trial. 
Victim impact evidence is highly relevant to the sentencing 
decision because it reflects on the defendant's personal respon- 
sibility. Such evidence also bears upon the defendant's moral 
culpability because each capital defendant should anticipate 
the foreseeable consequences of his or her actions. Additionally, 
93. Id. at 2612 (O'Connor, J., concurring). - 
94. Id. (quoting Payne v. T e ~ e s s e e ,  111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991)). 
95. "If, in a particular case, a witness' testimony or a prosecutor's remark so 
infects the sentencing proceeding as to render it findamentally unfair, the defen- 
dant may seek appropriate relief under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." Id. 
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permitting states to admit victim impact evidence brings the 
scales of justice back into balance because such evidence allows 
the sentencing authority to consider the uniqueness of both the 
defendant and the victim. 
Opponents of Payne argue that the elimination of the per 
se bar against victim impact evidence during the sentencing 
phase of capital trials is unduly prejudicial to defendants. How- 
ever, this objection is mitigated by a defendant's right to  resort 
to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to  
exclude victim impact evidence that is unduly prejudicial. 
In short, the Payne Court reached a compromise by allow- 
ing the use of victim impact evidence during the sentencing 
phase of capital trials while providing defendants with an es- 
cape hatch in the event of undue prejudice. This, unlike Booth 
and Gathers, is a fair result. 
Stephen M. Sargent 
